Abstract: This paper identifies emerging trends in the world economy during the next decade. The first is that China will overtake the U.S. in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), ending more than a century of U.S. leadership as the world's largest economy. The second is that Developing Asia, excluding Japan, will overtake the G7, a group of the seven largest industrialized economies established in 1975-6.
2 from policies adopted to cope with the downturn. Could a new and perhaps unexpected shock interrupt the recovery?
An obvious threat to the restoration of economic growth is the continued worsening of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the inability of international institutions to cope with a fiscal and financial crisis in large countries like Spain and Italy. Among the emerging economies the challenges are different, but equally daunting. Can China successfully handle the inflationary pressures following the vast expansion of lending in response to the financial crisis? Will India undertake a fiscal consolidation without threatening rapid growth, now exceeding the growth of China?
In this paper we shift attention from threats to the short-term growth of the world economy, as formidable as these may be, to growth potential over the next decade. The fundamentals for the world economy are strong. Moreover, it is time to recognize the emerging trends that have developed since the watershed reforms of China and India more than two decades ago. A massive reconfiguration of the world economy is gradually unfolding and will be completed in the next ten years.
We focus on the Rise of Developing Asia, where this refers to sixteen economies of East and South Asia, excluding Japan. These include China and India, the two largest countries of the world in population and two of the most rapidly growing economies.
Developing Asia also includes the Newly Industrialized Economies of Asia -Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Developing Asia has emerged from the Great Recession of [2007] [2008] [2009] with growth trends largely intact. This reflects "lessons learned" during the Asian Crisis of the 1990's and the deployment of substantial international reserves as buffers against the recessionary shock. and Brazil will overtake the U.K., leading to a New World Economic Order in 2020: China, the U.S., India, Japan, Russia, Germany, and Brazil. The G7 was established as a group of the six leading advanced economies in 1975 and Canada was added in 1976. The rise of Developing Asia and other emerging and transition economies like Russia and Brazil is already anticipated in the shift from the G7 to the G20 for international policy deliberations.
How do we arrive at these conclusions? We first analyze the sources of economic growth for the world economy, seven regions, and fourteen major economies during four periods -1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2009 . We then project the potential growth rates of labor productivity and GDP for 122 economies over the ten-year period 2010-2020. Relative to historical growth for 1990-2009, we project lower growth rates for the world economy and the major regions.
In a previous paper 7 we have presented measures of real output and input, as well as by Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006) . Productivity is the ratio of real output to real input. These estimates are essential for projecting the potential growth of the U.S. and the world economy, as demonstrated by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008) .
As recently as 2000 the G7 economies accounted for more than half of world GDP, Noting that Japan belongs to the G7 and not to Developing Asia, the change to Asia will occur even earlier.
In Section 2 we present our measures of output, input, and productivity. We document the resurgence of economic growth in the world economy after 1995 and the deceleration of growth after 2005 in Section 3. In Section 4 we allocate economic growth to the contributions of capital and labor inputs and productivity and show that input growth greatly predominates. We present relative levels of output and input per capita and productivity for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2009 in Section 5. Section 6 describes the uncertainties about the future growth of the world economy and Section 7 gives our projections of potential growth for 2010-2020. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Growth Accounting.
The major challenge in implementing a consistent and integrated production account like that of Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006) is the construction of a measure of real input.
The 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) and BLS (1993) have provided measures of the price and quantity of labor services. These can be combined with the price and quantity of capital services introduced by BLS (1983) to generate price and quantity indexes of real input, as well as multifactor productivity. The primary obstacle to constructing of capital service measures is the lack of market rental data for different types of capital.
An alternative approach for measuring rental prices is to impute these prices from market transactions prices for assets, employing the user cost formula introduced by Jorgenson (1963) . This requires estimates of depreciation and the rate of return, as well as asset prices. Measures of asset prices and depreciation, as well as investment and capital stocks, are presented in BEA's (2011) reproducible wealth accounts. BLS employs the imputed rental prices as weights for accumulated stocks of assets in generating price and quantity measures of capital services.
The most important innovation in the prototype system of national accounts developed by Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006) estimates of capital services are described as follows: "By associating these estimates with the standard breakdown of value added, the contribution of (labor) and capital to production can be portrayed in a form ready for use in the analysis of productivity in a way entirely consistent with the accounts of the System." Our measures of capital and labor inputs are consistent with the new architecture for the U.S. national accounts, the 2008 SNA, Schreyer's (2001) OECD Productivity Manual, and his OECD Manual, Measuring Capital.
The output data for our growth accounts are compiled from World Development Indicators Online (2011). The input data are drawn from the following sources:
 The Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED) is our source for all input data for 24 OECD countries and data on employment and hours worked for all countries. 8 This is also the source of labor quality growth for 103 countries; we use our own estimates, as described in Jorgenson and Vu (2010) To analyze the restructuring of the world economy, we first consider the shares of world product and growth for the seven regions, the G7 economies, and seven leading economies of Developing Asia presented in Table 1 . The G7 economies accounted for slightly over half of world product in 2000. However, the growth rate of these economies has lagged considerably behind world growth rates. This has led to a decline of eleven percentage points in the G7 share of world product from 52. Japan had fallen from its ranking as the world's second largest economy to third largest after China, but remained second among the G7 economies. 9 Germany had dropped to fourth place by 2000, following the U.S., China, and Japan, but had fallen behind India by 2009.
However, Germany has retained its position as the leading European economy. France, Italy and the U.K. were considerably smaller, but similar in size. Canada was the smallest of the G7 economies.
Sources of World Economic Growth.
In this section our first objective is to allocate the growth of world output between input growth and productivity. Surprisingly, input growth greatly predominates. Productivity growth accounted for 14.1 percent of world growth during 1990-1995, while input growth accounted for the rest, as shown in Table 2 We have divided the contribution of labor input between hours worked and labor quality. Hours worked reflects the mobilization of labor by increased labor force participation and higher rates of utilization of labor. Hours worked have grown more strongly that labor quality in Developing Asia throughout the period 1990-2009. Growth of hours worked has been highly cyclical in the G7 economies and exceeded labor quality growth during 1995-2000, but was negative for the other periods. For the world economy the growth of labor quality exceeded growth of hours worked in 1990-1995, but hours worked have grown more rapidly than labor quality since 1995.
World Output, Input, and Productivity.
The final step in analyzing the world growth resurgence is to characterize the evolution of levels of output, input, and productivity for the world economy, the seven economic regions, the G7 economies, and the seven leading countries of Developing Asia.
We estimate the levels of per capita output, per capita input, and productivity for each of the 122 economies in a given year, using the following methodology: o The per capita level of labor input is a product of per capita labor hours worked and the labor quality index, standardizing to 100 for the US level in 2000.
 The level of productivity is the ratio of output to input.
Taking the U.S. levels of output, input, and productivity in 2000 as 100.0, we estimate levels of output, input, and productivity for each of the 122 economies in the benchmark years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2009 . In Table 3 we present levels of output per capita at the beginning of the transition from socialism in 1990, at the start of the worldwide IT investment boom in 1995, at the beginning of the dot-com crash in 2000, the completion of the recovery in 2005, and the end of the period covered by our study in 2009.
We also present input per capita and productivity for these years. We observe that world input per capita has converged more rapidly to U.S. levels than world productivity. Although institutional barriers to accumulation of human and nonhuman capital have proven to be formidable, these obstacles have been gradually overcome.
As globalization has proceeded, the transfer of technologies from industrialized economies to the developing world has required time and effort. Networks among co-operating activities must be established and obsolete methods for organizing production must be displaced by up-to-date techniques that employ information technology equipment and software.
6. Future Uncertainties.
Our methodology for projecting the growth of labor productivity and GDP is presented in detail in Jorgenson and Vu (2010) . The driving forces are demography and technology. The contributions of hours worked and labor quality can be projected with only a modest degree of uncertainty and are common to our alternative scenarios. Projections of the variables that describe technology are far more challenging. In making assumptions for each of these variables, we consider three scenarios: "base-case", "pessimistic", and "optimistic"
and label these the alternative assumptions.
We follow the approach of Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2008) East & North Africa, we extrapolate the gap observed for the past ten years.
Our alternative assumptions for the more uncertain variables over the period 2010-2020 are specified in the three scenarios -"base-case", "pessimistic", and "optimistic".
 Our assumptions about capital quality growth, reflecting changes in the composition of the capital stock, are as follows. 
Pessimistic and optimistic cases:
For the U.S. we assume the "pessimistic case" for capital quality growth is the average growth observed for 1990-1995 and 2005-2009. For the "optimistic case" we assume this growth to be the same as for 1995-2005. For the remaining economies, the "pessimistic case" and the "optimistic case" for each country is the deviation from the "base case" by one standard deviation of the base case assumed above for the economies in its economic group/region.
 Our assumptions about TFP growth over 2010-2020 is as follows: The "base-case":
We assume TFP growth is will be the average observed 
Potential Growth of the World Economy, 2010-2020
Based on the assumptions outlined in the previous section, we project the potential growth rates of labor productivity and GDP over the period 2010-2020 for 122 economies. Table 4 summarizes the results for the world economy, each of the seven groups, the seven major industrialized economies, and seven leading economies of Developing Asia. We consider three scenarios -"base-case", "pessimistic", and "optimistic".
Productivity growth in the United States will decline somewhat from 1.94 percent in 1990-2009 to 1.49 percent in 2010-2020. This is mainly due to slower growth in labor quality, the upgrading of the labor force due to education and experience. The baby boomers will begin to retire, reducing the level of experience. The educational attainment of age cohorts leaving the educational system has been steady for more than three decades and will be difficult to improve. These forces will reduce the growth of labor input and the rate of capital deepening.
Second, U.S. GDP growth will decline a bit more than productivity growth, due to a modest decline in labor force growth. In short, the U.S. growth rate of the past two decades will be nearly impossible to sustain. This could only occur under very optimistic assumptions about the development of technology and the additional capital deepening that this would induce. We also present a pessimistic scenario, based on the continuation of low growth rates of total factor productivity like those that prevailed after 2005 and before 1995.
Growth of the world economy will decline by less than a quarter of a percentage point, relative to the robust growth of the past two decades. This is due mainly to the gradual slowing of labor force growth around the world and the reduced capital deepening that will result.
Growth in the G7, already relatively low during the past two decades, will decline further. The feverish growth of Developing Asia will also slow by almost a full percentage point.
Nonetheless, the growth rate differential between the two regions will be more than four percentage points, so that the wide remaining gap in levels of GDP per capita will close at rapid pace.
Although the growth of Developing Asia will slow during 2010-2020, relative to the past decade, the share of Developing Asia in World GDP will continue to rise from 28.6 in 2010 to 36.8 percent in 2020. Meanwhile, the share of the G7 will decline from 40.6 percent in 2010 to 33.3 percent in 2020. With this projected pattern of economic growth Developing Asia will overtake the G7 by 2018. 11 In our projections China will overtake the U.S. by 2018 and India will surpass Japan in 2011.
U.S. growth will continue to lead the G7, even with the slowdown we have analyzed.
All the G7 countries will slow further and growth could disappear entirely in Italy under 11 In this projection, we assume that the PPP exchange rates observed in 2009 will remain unchanged over 2010-2020. pessimistic assumptions. The mediocre growth rate of Japan for the past two decades will be further reduced, due to strongly adverse demographic trends. Growth in the United Kingdom will surpass the pace of the past two decades. Despite relatively favorable demographics and substantial investment, U.K. growth will lag behind growth of the world economy.
It is difficult to paint an optimistic picture of the outlook for Europe and Canada. The major European countries failed to make the transition to a knowledge economy called for by the Lisbon Agenda ten years ago. The European Union has made little progress in formulating a policy response in its more recent report, Europe 2020. This is understandable in view of more pressing policy issues arising from the ongoing fiscal and financial crisis. Canada has come through the crisis very well, especially given its proximity to the U.S. However, Canadian productivity growth will remain below U.S. levels.
Turning, finally, to the emerging and transition economies, the outlook for China and India continues to be very sanguine, but quite different. Growth rates in China will fall, relative to the blistering pace of the past two decades, while remaining in the neighborhood of 7.5 percent per year. India's growth rate will rise to 6.5 percent, which is not sufficient to avoid a considerable fiscal consolidation. Russia's growth will be sufficient to double the size of the Russian economy within two decades and Russia will overtake Germany in 2019. Brazil will grow at the same rate as the world economy and will overtake the U.K. in 2012.
Conclusions.
The emergence of Asia from the underdevelopment that persisted until the middle of the last century is the great economic success story of our times. This has created a new model for economic growth built on globalization and the patient accumulation of human and nonhuman capital over decades. The new growth paradigm places a premium on skillful management by public and private authorities. The performance of the leading countries in developing this paradigm -first Japan, then the Asian Tigers, and now China and India -has changed the course of economic development in Asia and around the world.
While the Rise of Asia will be firmly established by 2020, pessimistic trends in demography will further undercut growth in Japan and will eventually affect growth prospects in Korea and China. Demographic developments in Europe will also exert a powerful drag on growth. No reform initiatives are within sight that could change the pessimistic outlook for technology in Europe and Canada, but successful educational investments in Asia and Europe and around the world, except for the United States, will help to sustain economic growth.
The role of the U.S. in the world economy has permanently changed and not for the better. Unfortunately, this will strengthen populist forces on the left and right, diverting attention from the policy issues that have emerged from the financial and economic crisis.
Ideological battles threaten to overwhelm the unfinished agenda of formulating and implementing sustainable fiscal and monetary policies. To quote Winston Churchill: "You can always count on Americans to do the right thing -after they've tried everything else." For professional economists the task that remains is to construct an empirical theory of economic growth that can serve as a guide to policy. The United States and other industrialized countries will remain far in advance of Developing Asia in terms of per capita GDP. But the experience of Japan and the four Asian Tigers tells us the advanced economies can emerge outside Europe and North America. It is only a matter of time until these developments spread to China, India, and the major countries of Developing Asia. We have shown in this paper that this time will be measured in decades rather than years. 
